The partition of Iraq may be a solution...

Divided We Stand
By Pejman Yousefzadeh : BIO| 03 Aug 2006



The current reconstruction effort in Iraq seeks to keep the current boundaries of Iraq whole. But by keeping Iraq whole, the United States may in fact be hindering a successful reconstruction effort and needlessly delaying the achievement of an honorable peace and the successful withdrawal of American troops.


It may be that Iraqis want to keep their country whole. If so, that choice ought to be respected. But in the event that keeping Iraq whole is not a sine qua non of the reconstruction effort according to the Iraqi people, the partition of Iraq into natural boundaries is a way to bring the reconstruction to a successful end while at the same time establishing successor states to Iraq that may be more coherent and easier to keep together than Iraq itself was.



The Original Creation of Iraq


Iraq was created through the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its current boundaries are the construction of Western powers. This has caused Shi'ites, Sunnis and Kurds to be lumped together into a single state.


Because of the sectarian tensions that have existed between these groups, their forced cohabitation into a single state has always been a dicey affair. Sectarian violence was kept at a minimum and tensions were sublimated by the presence of an autocratic Ba'athist regime -- led for most of its existence by Saddam Hussein. But it is doubtful that even Saddam's iron hand would have been successful for long in keeping sectarian tensions hidden away. Indeed, those tensions became strong enough even during the presence of the Ba'athist regime that the Shi'ites staged a rebellion in the immediate aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and an autonomous Kurdish entity organized itself in northern Iraq. Even if the Ba'ath Party had remained in power, the potent sectarian divisions would likely have caused Iraq to be rent by internal violence.


The long term prospects for a coherent and unified Iraq were therefore never very good. Now, with the removal of the Ba'athist regime, sectarian violence has bubbled to the surface. This does not make the removal of the former regime somehow wrong, but it does mean that the sectarian divisions will have to be dealt with as an obstacle to a successful stabilization effort.


Let's assume for the sake of argument that the Iraqi people may be open to a partition plan. There remain arguments against partition that should be addressed and overcome.


Does partition constitute failure?


There is rhetorical value in saying that a reconstruction effort has been able to keep Iraq "whole" and "unified" instead of saying that at the end of such an effort, Iraq was left "divided." We generally operate under a psychological conceit that says that dividing a country into separate entities is a bad choice and denotes failure in dealing with that country.


But why should this be so? The former Czechoslovakia split apart into a Czech Republic and the country of Slovakia. The partition was peaceful and has led to the existence of friendly relations between both countries. The former Soviet Union is a prime example of a country with sectarian and nationalistic divisions seething underneath the surface. Its partition has significantly lessened the chances of war and conflict between the nationalities and sects that made up the former Soviet Union.


Sometimes partition is preferable to keeping a country together despite all of the internal conditions that doom unity in the long run. In these cases, partition serves as a recognition of and response to the existence of long term instability within a country. Iraq currently labors under its internal divisions. Those divisions may not be resolved in a way that will allow the current state of Iraq to exist in the long term. A new path -- one involving partition -- may have to be taken.


Will an independent Kurdistan poison relations with Turkey?


An independent Kurdistan would likely be one of the Iraqi successor states. Because of traditional animosities between Kurds and Turks, there is the question of what Turkish reaction will be to the creation of a Kurdish state.


Many anticipate that the creation of an independent Kurdistan won't be received well in Turkey. But bringing the Turks around to the fact that there is an independent Kurdish state is not impossible. For one thing, the existing autonomous Kurdish entity is in many ways a state in everything but name. For another, making the existing entity into a homeland for the Kurds might help remove pressure from Turkey to cede any authority or territory for the creation of a Kurdish state. The current Kurdish entity is renowned for functioning effectively and within present-day Iraq the Kurds clearly have the most effective institutions of government running. This autonomous entity is prepared to step into its role as a nation-state if a partition takes place and if an independent Kurdistan is recognized as a sovereign country. Indeed, it is already currently performing key nation-state-like functions.


The fact that a de facto Kurdish homeland exists for all practical purposes should help Turkey acclimate itself to the creation of a de jure Kurdish homeland. There may continue to be issues that need to be worked out between the Kurds and the Turks, but the current autonomous Kurdish entity provides us with a valuable template to fashion a peaceful and workable coexistence between an independent and sovereign Kurdistan and its neighbors.


Will the creation of a Shi'ite successor state lead to Iranian influence?


Along with an independent Kurdistan, two other successor states will likely be the result of any partition. One will be a Sunni successor state. Another will be a Shi'ite state.


The mere mention of the creation of a Shi'ite successor state will likely cause alarm bells to go off in the minds of American policymakers. The concern, naturally, will be that a Shi'ite successor state will become an Iranian satellite, given that Iran is overwhelmingly a Shi'ite country.


This conclusion is premature. The mere existence of two Shi'ite states side by side does not necessarily entail the subjugation of one as a satellite to the other. Nation-states have interests that they pursue rationally (if not always correctly) and these interests -- maintaining a balance of power, balancing against certain threats, bandwagoning with potential allies in favor of a particular policy goal -- play a powerful role in determining national policy and statecraft. Statecraft is not determined merely by the nature of domestic regimes or similarities and/or differences between the populations of various nation-states. Thus, despite the fact that they were both Communist regimes, the Soviet Union maintained a long rivalry with the People's Republic of China. Ditto for the relationship between the USSR and Tito's Yugoslavia.


Will a Shi'ite successor state to Iraq have friendly relations with Iran? Possibly. But that won't necessarily make that state a puppet or satellite of Iran. And we cannot automatically assume that a Shi'ite state will be friendly with Iran. A Shi'ite state will have its own security interests and foreign policy goals to follow. Iran will similarly calculate its own goals and interests and, given the existence of conflicting interests between Iran and Iraq (conflicting interests which led to the outbreak of an eight-year long war between the two countries), it is likely that there will also be conflicts between the interests of Iran and a Shi'ite successor state as well. These conflicting interests -- along with an overall Persian/Arab ethnic division -- will significantly lessen the chances that a Shi'ite state will become an Iranian vassal. To the extent that the nature of populations have any bearing on this issue, the existence of centuries-old tensions and rivalries between Arabs and Persians and the differences between the Iranian theological stance of direct clerical involvement in politics and the Iraqi Shi'ite belief in clerical "quietism" or political non-involvement serve to reduce concerns that a Shi'ite successor state will be in thrall to Iran.


None of this means that we should wholly discount the possibility that Iran may exercise an outsized degree of influence on a Shi'ite successor state. Indeed, any partition process must include strict warnings to Iran stating that attempts unduly to influence the affairs of a Shi'ite successor state will not be tolerated. But we should not believe that it is a foregone conclusion that such a state will become an Iranian puppet, and there are a whole host of disincentives for a Shi'ite successor state to allow itself to be sublimated to Iran. Moreover, if it is a foregone conclusion that a Shi'ite successor state will become an Iranian satellite, that may make the case for partition all the more compelling. Given the majority Shi'ite presence in present-day Iraq, leaving Iraq whole and unified may allow Iran to exercise influence throughout the country if we believe that Shi'ite political ascendancy will allow for the spread of Iranian influence into Iraq. In a worst case scenario, it is best to contain such influence by limiting it to a Shi'ite successor state rather than allowing Iranian geopolitical ambitions to also influence the fate of the Sunnis and Kurds in the context of an Iraq with present-day boundaries.


To arguing on behalf of partition is a difficult. But the amount of sectarian divisions in Iraq may be impossible to overcome while at the same time keeping the current boundaries of the country intact. Partition should be a last resort but it may prove to be an effective way to successfully reconstruct the region and institute a lasting and honorable peace. It deserves consideration as a serious policy option. And if the Iraqi people are open to the partition of their country, we should be as well.


Pejman Yousefzadeh is a TCS Daily contributing writer.
[Iraq]
[Shi'ite]
[Sunni]
[Kurds]
[Iraq Civil War]