THE ISSUE of whether or not the UAE should be allowed to manage U.S. ports highlights the paradoxes involved in fighting al Qaeda in the Middle East.

Dubai Dealings
The pros and cons of the UAE ports deal.
by Dan Darling
02/23/2006 7:45:00 AM

A GREAT DEAL of public and political controversy has arisen in recent days over the proposed deal to allow the United Arab Emirates (UAE) state-owned company Dubai World manage several major U.S. ports, with critics arguing that doing so will leave the United States more open to a terrorist attack. In evaluating this argument, it is worth examining how al Qaeda itself views the UAE, a task made far easier by drawing on a newly-released al Qaeda document from 2002 that contains a list of demands to UAE officials if they wish to avoid terrorist attacks on their soil.

To begin with, it is important to recognize that the UAE is not Iran and has entirely justifiable reasons for claiming that it is both one of the most moderate countries in the Arab world as well as a valuable partner in the U.S.-led war on terrorism.

Ironically, during his defense of the UAE's record on cooperation, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld failed to mention one of their most significant achievements to date: the November 2002 capture of Abd Rahim al-Nashiri, a senior al Qaeda leader generally regarded as the mastermind of the USS Cole bombing and the head of the terror network's maritime operations. While this would indeed be a significant achievement in its own right, it is made all the more remarkable by the fact that the UAE had been directly threatened by the al Qaeda leadership several months prior to al-Nashiri's capture.

According to the now-declassified al Qaeda document labeled target=_blank>AFGP-2002-603856 by the United States, al Qaeda explicitly threatened UAE officials with attacks if they refused to cease cooperation with the United States. Written between May and June 2002 and addressed in particular to officials in the emirates of Abu-Dhabi and Dubai (the UAE is a federation of seven emirates), the document claims that the UAE has engaged in "spying, persecution, [sic] detainments" against al Qaeda members operating on its soil at the behest of the United States, noting that, "authorities have recently detained a number of Mujahideen and handed them over to suppressive organizations in their country in addition to having a number of them still in its custody" and that "these practices bring the country into a fighting ring in which it cannot endure or escape from its consequences." These threats appear to suggest that whatever else al Qaeda thinks of the UAE, it does not regard the nation as being among its friends.

Yet the document also provides ample ammunition to those concerned over the UAE port deal, with its al Qaeda author asserting to the Abu-Dhabi and Dubai officials that "we have infiltrated your security, censorship, and monetary agencies along with other agencies that should not be mentioned" and that "we are confident that you are fully aware that your agencies will not get to the same high level of your American Lords. Furthermore, your intelligence will not be cleverer than theirs, and your censorship capabilities are not worth much against what they have reached . . . you are an easier target than them; your homeland is exposed to us."

In a rare window into al Qaeda's strategic mindset, the author explains, "our policies are not to operate in your homeland and/or tamper with your security because we are occupied with others which we consider are enemies of this nation. If you compel us to do so, we are prepared to postpone our program for a short period and allocate some time for you." A list of demands is then presented to the UAE to avoid the prospect of al Qaeda attacks, consisting only of releasing all known al Qaeda members detained by the UAE since the September 11 attacks as well as anyone else who had been detained on suspicions of involvement with the attacks. It should be noted that the UAE did not comply with these demands and while the nation has been spared any terrorist attacks to date this appears to be due more to al Qaeda's limited resources than a lack of desire. For instance, an audio message in March 2005 by Saudi al Qaeda leader Salih al-Oufi called upon fellow jihadis to carry out attacks against "crusader" targets in the UAE as well as Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait.

THE ISSUE of whether or not the UAE should be allowed to manage U.S. ports highlights many of the paradoxes involved in fighting al Qaeda in the Middle East as well as the dangers of over-simplifying or mischaracterizing U.S. allies in the region. The UAE has been a valuable U.S. ally in the areas of both military cooperation and counter-terrorism and should be rightly recognized as such. Yet it also faces a number of serious problems with regard to al Qaeda infiltration. The UAE is by no means the only Gulf state dealing with this issue, but it is currently the only nation that is seeking to manage major U.S. ports. It is by no means unreasonable for U.S. policymakers to seek strict assurances that these concerns will be rigorously addressed by the UAE before allowing one of its state-run corporations to manage such a sensitive and vulnerable aspect of U.S. infrastructure.

Finally, the debate over whether or not Dubai World should be allowed to manage U.S. ports should serve as the backdrop for a larger national debate on what American policy should be towards corporations, some of them fully or partially state-owned, heralding from countries where al Qaeda or its supporters are known to be active either by having infiltrated local government agencies or in some cases as having the support of established religious leaders or political parties.

Dubai World, which has never been linked to al Qaeda in any fashion, is well within its rights to complain that political opposition is only organized against them while ignoring the far greater number of U.S.-based businesses coming from other Gulf states with far greater levels of al Qaeda infiltration (most notably Saudi Arabia). Therefore, it is extremely important for supporters of the Dubai World deal to recognize that there are entirely valid security concerns relating to the UAE, just as opponents must recognize that these same security concerns are equally valid relating to a number of other countries as well.

Dan Darling is counterterrorism consultant for the Manhattan Institute Center for Policing Terrorism.